INTRODUCTION
We consider a risk-sensitive optimal control problem for hidden Markov models (HMM), i.e., controlled Markov chains where state information is only available to the controller via an output (message) process. The optimal control of HMM under standard, risk-neutral performance criteria, e.g., discounted and average costs, has received much attention in the past. Many basic results and numerous applications have been reported in the literature in this subject; see ABFGM], BE2] , KV], and references therein. Controlled Markov chains with full state information and a risk-sensitive performance criterion have also received some attention, dating back at least to the work of Howard and Matheson HOM]; see also BSO] , CSO].
On the other hand, quite the opposite is the situation for HMM under risksensitive criteria, e.g., expected value of the exponential of additive costs. Whittle and others (see WHI] and references therein) have extensively studied the risksensitive optimal control of partially-observable linear exponential quadratic Gaussian (LEQG) systems; see also BVS]. More recently, James, Baras and Elliott JBE] , BJ] , have treated the risk-sensitive partially-observable optimal control problem of discrete-time non-linear systems.
The paucity of results in this subject area can be mostly attributed to the lack in the past of appropriate su cient statistics, or information states. As is well known, if the cost criterion being considered is of the type \expected value of additive costs," then the posterior probability density, given all available information up to the present, constitutes a su cient statistic for control (or information state); see ABFGM], BE2] , KV]. The latter result was originally proved by Shiryaev in the early sixties SHI1]-SHI2], who also proved that this was not the case for nonadditive cost criteria SHI3]. In particular, the posterior probability density is not a su cient statistic for HMM under an \exponential of sum of costs" type of criterion, which is non-additive. This fact was overlooked in GHE], thus invalidating the claims of optimality for the policies obtained in that paper. { { Certainly, one can pose a well de ned stochastic optimal control problem given any statistic. However, if the chosen statistic is not su cient, then one cannot hope to obtain the \overall" optimal policy, except by serendipity.
Recently, James, Baras, and Elliott BJ] , JBE] have derived information states for HMM under an \exponential of additive costs" criterion, and have also given dynamic programming equations from which optimal values and controls can be computed, for problems with a nite horizon. Building upon the results by Baras, James and Elliott, we report in this paper results of an investigation on the nature and structure of risk-sensitive controllers. We pose the following question:
How does risk-sensitivity manifest itself in the structure of a controller?
Whittle WHI] has addressed a similar question for the LEQG problem, and he has shown that much insight can be gained from a comparison of the riskneutral (i.e., the classical LQG) and risk-sensitive equations describing the optimal controller. In our context, one di culty encountered is that optimal controllers are de ned in terms of di erent information states for the risk-neutral and risk sensitive cases; see also BJ] , JBE].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some basic results about utility and risk theory. In section 3 we present our model, and recall the main results on information states from BJ]-JBE] that will be needed for our developments. Section 4 contains several general results, and in section 5 we present a particular case study of a popular benchmark problem. We obtain structural results for the optimal risk-sensitive controller, and compare it to that of the riskneutral case. Furthermore, we show that indeed the risk-sensitive controller and its corresponding information state converge to the known solutions for the risk-neutral situation, as the risk factor goes to zero. We also study the in nite and general risk aversion cases.
RATIONAL PREFERENCES, UTILITY AND RISK
Consider the situation where a decision maker (DM) is faced with several choices, the outcomes of which are uncertain. That is, the DM can choose among several gambles or lotteries 2 , and the consequent reward R for the lottery is a random variable, with a known probability distribution P . With no loss of generality for our purposes, we may associate P with the lottery itself. Utility theory,
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as developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern (vNM), see BE1] , LR], tries to quantitatively describe the preferences of the DM, under the assumption that these are rational, in the following sense. Let P 1 and P 2 be two of the choices available to the DM, and suppose that he always prefers P 1 over P 2 . Then, (vNM) assume that there exists a complete and transitive relation \ " on the set of lotteries such that P 1 P 2 : 
CONSTANT RISK AVERSION
In many situations it is to be expected that the DM has either a decreasing or increasing risk aversion coe cient r( ), as a function of the DM's wealth. For example, it is to be expected that a portfolio manager may be more reticent to risk half his assets if the value of the portfolio is a billion dollars, than if it is $10; 000; see BE2] for a very nice presentation of problems of this nature. On the other hand, if r( ) = constant, then the DM's sensitivity to risk does not depend on the level of his current wealth. To gain more insight into this situation, consider the certainty equivalent for a lottery P , denoted by c 2 IR and de ned by: In the sequel, we will be concerned with negative net bene ts, i.e., costs, instead of rewards, and thus we will seek to minimize disutilities instead of maximizing utilities. Hence, correspondingly the following disutility function L( ) will be considered, for 2 IR, 6 = 0: L(c) := sgn( )exp( c);
where sgn( ) denotes the sign of .
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THE CONTROLLED HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL
A controlled hidden Markov model is given by a ve-tuple hX; Y; U; fP(u) : u 2 Ug; fQ(u) : u 2 Ugi; here X = f1; 2; : : :; N X g is the nite set of (internal) states, Y = f1; 2; : : :; N Y g is the set of observations (or messages), U = f1; 2; : : :; N U g is the set of decisions (or controls). In addition, we have that P(u) := p i;j (u) is the N X N X state transition matrix, and Q(u) := q x;y (u) is the N X N Y state/message matrix, i.e., q x;y (u) is the probability of receiving message y when the state is x and action u has been selected. In the operations research literature similar models are called partially observable Markov decision processes FAM1], FAM2], and in the computer science literature nite state stochastic automata DOB], PAZ]. Two types of information patterns are of interest.
Information Pattern 1 (IP1):
At decision epoch t, the system is in the (unobservable) state X t = i, a decision U t = u is taken, and the state evolves to X t+1 = j with probability p i;j (u). Once the state has evolved to X t+1 , an observation Y t+1 is gathered, such that:
ProbfY t+1 = y j X t+1 = i; U t = ug = q x;y (u): 
Information Pattern 2 (IP2):
At decision epoch t, the system is in the (unobservable) state X t = i, a decision U t = u is taken, and an observation Y t+1 is gathered, such that:
ProbfY t+1 = y j X t = i; U t = ug = q i;y (u):
The state then evolves to X t+1 = j with probability p i;j (u). Hence, based on I (2) t := (U 0 ; Y 1 ; U 1 ; Y 2 ; : : : ; U t ; Y t+1 ), a new decision U t+1 is selected.
Hereafter we will simply write I t and Y t for a generic information pattern and the ltration generated by the available observations, respectively, up to decision epoch t.
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Given an expected cost per stage (i; u) 7 ! c(i; u), the sum of costs for the nite horizon M is given by
The risk-sensitive optimal control problem is that of nding a control policy = where 6 = 0 is the risk-factor, and sgn( ) is the sign of ; here IE denotes the expectation induced by policy and, implicitly, the initial distribution of the state. By computing the Taylor series expansion of J ( ), when is su ciently small, the risk sensitivity of the above criterion becomes evident in that, in addition to the standard expected sum of costs, a second order term in the expansion measures the variance of C M ; see WHI] for details. If > 0, then the controller is risk-averse or pessimistic, whereas if < 0 then the controller is risk-prefering or optimistic.
INFORMATION STATES
As for the risk-neutral case ABFGM], BE], KV], an equivalent stochastic optimal control problem can be formulated in terms of information states and separated policies. Here we follow the work of Baras, Elliott, and James BJ]-JBE], who derived information states both for problems with continuous JBE] and discrete BJ] state variables. First, we equivalently reformulate the stochastic control problem in terms of a canonical measure, as follows. Let Y t be the ltration generated by the available observations up to decision epoch t, and let G t be the ltration generated by the sequence of states and observations up to that time as given by (IP). Then the probability measure induced by a policy is equivalent to a canonical distribution P y , under which fY t g is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d), uniformly distributed, independent of fX t g, and fX t g is a controlled Markov chain with transition matrix as above. We have that dP dP y j G t = t ; 
where f M g is obtained from (3.5) under the action of policy . Hence, the original partially observed problem is equivalently expressed as one with complete state information, i.e., f t g. For ease of presentation, we consider hereafter the riskaverse case only ( > 0); the risk-seeking case is treated similarly.
GENERAL RESULTS
As in the completely observed case HOM], de ne the disutility contribution matrix as x : D(u)] i;j := p i;j (u) exp( c(i; u)):
(4:1)
x Notice that we are using expected one-stage cost functions. If on the other hand a model using one-stage cost functions that depend explicitly on the current and next state, e.g, c(i; j; u) is used, then (4.1) is modi ed accordingly.
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The following lemma gives the recursions that govern the evolution of the information state. Recall that IE y ] is the expectation with respect to the canonical measure P y , and thus for a given function f : Y ! IR, 
Proof:
We proceed by induction in k, with the case k = 0 being trivially veri ed from where the rst inequality follows due to the induction hypothesis, and the second inequality due to (4.5).
u t Remark 4.3: For the risk-neutral case, a similar result was initially pointed out by Hence, since by (4.14) ( ; u) is linear in IR N X + , so is J u ( ; M ? k). u t
A CASE STUDY
We consider a popular benchmark problem for which much is known in the riskneutral case. This is a two-state replacement problem which models failure-prone units in production/manufacturing systems, communication systems, etc. The underlying state of the unit can either be working (X t = 0) or failed (X t = 1), and the available actions are to keep (U t = 0) the current unit or replace (U t = 1) the unit by a new one. The cost function (x; u) 7 ! c(x; u) is as follows: let R > C > 0, then c(0; 0) = 0, c(1; 0) = C, c(x; 1) = R. The messages received have probability 1=2 < q < 1 of coinciding with the true state of the unit. The state transition matrices are given as:
P (0) Theorem 5.1. If CR k replace is nonempty, then it includes the (2)-axis, i.e., IR 2 + is partitioned by a line through the origin such that for values of 2 IR 2 + above the line it is optimal to replace the unit, and it is optimal to keep the unit otherwise.
Proof:
We proceed to show that if it is optimal to keep the unit in the (2)-axis (see {16{ which is nonempty by (5.4). Then by minimizing overÃ k?1 the terms on the right hand side in (5.6) we obtain an upper-bound for this expression, and we nally get that:
J 0 ( ; M ? k) < e R (1) (1) + e R (2) (1) = J 1 ( ; M ? k);
and therefore it is optimal to keep the unit at all 2 IR 2 + .
u t
Using the dynamic programming recursions (5.3), the structure of optimal policies can be further elucidated. First we need a simple technical result, the proof of which is presented in the Appendix. The following theorem gives more precise results on the structure of optimal policies, and its proof is presented in the Appendix. (1) = (2); (5:11) such that the region to the left (above) the line is the replace control region.
Remark 5.1. Note that the simplest nontrivial decision process corresponds to the case M = 2, since (5.9) is always satis ed for K = 1.
SMALL AND LARGE RISK LIMITS
In order to build a better understanding as to how risk sensitivity manifests itself in the structure of the optimal control strategies, we analyze both the small risk sensitivity limiting case ( ! 0) and the in nite risk aversion case ( ! 1).
First, we give some insight on conditions (5.9).
Remark 5.2. Let K be a positive integer. Then if R KC, we have that sgn( )e R sgn( )e KC ; and hence the DM would never prefer to replace the unit, at any point within the last K stages. Therefore, R KC is a su cient condition for the optimal policy to be M?k ( ) = 0, 8 2 IR + , k = 1; 2; : : :; M ? K, i.e., it is optimal to keep the unit for the last K stages; c.f. (5.9). In nite Risk Aversion Case ( ! 1).
Consider the situation ! 1 in (5.8). Note that for large enough:
Therefore, as ! 1, we have from (5.9) that the necessary and su cient condition for it to be always optimal to keep the unit in the last K stages approaches R 2C, which is the same condition for it to be always optimal to keep the unit in the last {18{ two stages. Furthermore, as is readily veri ed from (4.10), if R < 2C and ! 1 then it is always optimal to replace the unit at stage M ? k, for all 2 k M, i.e., the threshold line tends to the (1)-axis. Hence the DM becomes myopic in the sense that, except for the last one, all decision epochs appear to be the same. The DM appears to always face a two-stage decision process, the simplest one possible; c.f. Remark 5.1. In the jargon of Whittle WHI], it could be then said that an in nitely risk averse DM exhibits \neurotic" behavior, his optimal strategy being of the \bang bang" type with respect to the parameter R: if R 2C, then M?k ( ) = 0, and otherwise M?k ( ) = 1, for all 2 k M. This behavior can be partly explained by noting that at most one change will then occur in the stream of costs, thus achieving least variability in the cumulative cost.
Small Risk Aversion Case ( ! 0).
Next, we examine the question: How do the results in Theorems 4.1, 5.1-5.2 compare to known results for the risk-neutral case? The answer is that the risk-sensitive controller obtained here has as its small risk limit the known riskneutral controller, and both controllers have in general a similar structure. Similarly as in WCC], the dynamic programming equations for the risk-neutral case can be written, with the conditional probability distribution of the state as the information state. Then, it can be shown that the optimal risk-neutral controller has a structure similar to the risk-sensitive controller given in Theorem 5.1. Furthermore, it can be shown that the necessary and su cient condition in the risk-neutral case for the separated policy M?1 ( ) = : : : = M?K ( ) = 0 to be optimal is: R > KC ? 0 K?1 ; (5:12) where 0 K?1 is obtained as the derivative with respect to , evaluated as ! 0, of (5.8). As can be easily veri ed, the above is nothing but the small risk limit (i.e., as ! 0) of (5.9). General Risk Aversion Case ( > 0).
The following result helps bring to light a manifestation of aversion to risk in the DM; its proof is given in the Appendix.
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Lemma 5.3. Let > 0, then for all k > 1:
(5:13) u t
Notice that the decision to replace a unit involves an uncertain, and therefore a risky, investment in that the unit being replaced may actually be in working condition, or it may subsequently fail. This is re ected in (5.9), (5.12) and (5.13) in that a risk neutral DM or controller may decide to replace a unit for values of R higher than a risk averse DM or controller would not. Then the condition for it to be optimal to keep the unit is: (1) = (2):
(A:10)
Thus the optimal policy is of the threshold type, such that it is optimal to keep the unit for values below and on the line determined by (A.10), and to replace the unit otherwise.
STAGE K, 2 < K M. Then, the condition for it to be optimal to keep the unit is: 
